Since the launch of Russia’s full-scale war in Ukraine in February 2022, the international community—led by the United States, European Union, and United Kingdom—has implemented an increasingly stringent sanctions regime. The objective has been to isolate the Kremlin economically, constrain its military-industrial capacity, and erode its ability to sustain prolonged conflict. Sanctions have been sweeping, targeting everything from oligarch-owned yachts and luxury real estate to uranium, gas pipelines, and high-tech components. Despite this extensive list, titanium, a crucial element in aerospace engineering and national defense, has notably remained outside the purview of these restrictive measures.
The rationale for this selective omission was initially practical. Abrupt disruption of titanium imports from Russia, one of the world's leading suppliers, risked imperiling vital production lines in the civil aviation and defense sectors. However, more than two years later, reliance on Russian titanium continues, and Western firms are only now beginning to make significant adjustments to their sourcing strategies. These developments compound the strategic inconsistency at the heart of the sanctions framework.
Russia has long maintained a dominant position in the aerospace-grade titanium market through VSMPO-AVISMA, the world’s largest vertically integrated titanium producer. Based in Verkhnyaya Salda in the Sverdlovsk region, VSMPO accounts for the vast majority of Russian titanium sponge and forged components used in the aerospace industry. As of 2020, Russia accounted for roughly 15% of global titanium sponge output and more than 45% of aerospace-grade titanium part supply. The company has extensive ties with Western aerospace manufacturers built over decades of cooperation, including joint ventures and direct supply contracts.
Before the 2022 invasion, Airbus was estimated to receive up to 60% of its titanium from VSMPO, while Boeing reportedly sourced as much as 80% from the Russian giant. Following the invasion, both firms announced intentions to reduce or cease reliance on Russian materials. Boeing terminated its longstanding joint venture and publicized a policy shift toward U.S.-based and allied suppliers. Airbus, after initially increasing procurement from VSMPO in 2022, began shifting its supply base in 2023.
Despite these pledges, data from Russian trade records suggest that titanium exports continued robustly. In 2022, VSMPO exported approximately 15,000 metric tons of titanium—valued at $370 million—largely to Western countries. By 2023, even amid reduced transparency in export reporting, VSMPO still shipped at least $345 million worth of titanium abroad. Major recipients included France, Germany, the United States, and the United Kingdom.
The continued export of Russian titanium is facilitated by a conspicuous exemption in the Western sanctions regime. While VSMPO’s parent company, Rostec, is under U.S. and EU sanctions along with its chief executive Sergey Chemezov, VSMPO itself has avoided direct listing in restrictive measures. The logic cited by Western officials centers on the logistical and economic disruption that a sudden titanium embargo could cause across civil aviation supply chains.
Export controls by the U.S. Commerce Department have targeted VSMPO’s import of sensitive technologies, not its ability to export titanium products. Ukraine is the only country to have applied sanctions to VSMPO directly. Airbus CEO Guillaume Faury encapsulated the commercial calculus in 2022, remarking that sanctioning Russian titanium would amount to “sanctioning ourselves.”
VSMPO has also utilized corporate subsidiaries such as VSMPO-Tirus to route material and maintain supply channels, often adhering to the technical wording if not the intent of Western restrictions. Aerospace procurement specialists have noted that such workarounds are widespread and point to systemic weaknesses in trade enforcement.
Western aerospace firms have made varying progress in decoupling from Russian titanium supply. Boeing halted direct purchases in 2022, but its suppliers—including France’s Safran—continued procuring Russian titanium through 2023. Airbus, despite publicly stating intentions to eliminate dependence on Russian sources, saw a notable surge in VSMPO imports, with 2022 figures marking a 940% increase over the previous year.
External demand and supply redistribution have led to high volatility in titanium alloy prices. According to Argus Metals, U.S. market prices reached $13 per pound by early 2024, a near tripling from pre-war averages. European prices climbed as well, reaching $9.41 per pound. These increases reflect not only material scarcity but the costs of retooling procurement systems and upgrading production capabilities to accommodate new sources.
Although direct military applications of titanium sourced from Russia are restricted under U.S. law—particularly the Specialty Metals Amendment (10 U.S. Code §2533b)—loopholes persist. Dual-use waivers and indirect sourcing arrangements through subcontractors have allowed Russian titanium to potentially enter military systems, particularly through commercial-off-the-shelf supply chains. This was highlighted in 2022 when the discovery of a Chinese alloy in F-35 production temporarily halted deliveries.
Critics argue that continued commercial use of Russian titanium undermines the credibility of the broader sanctions architecture. Defense lobbyists and policymakers have pointed out that even though many Russian exports have been blacklisted, titanium’s strategic role in defense makes its exemption increasingly untenable. Analysts have warned that VSMPO remains a revenue stream for the Kremlin’s wider war machine.
Following two years of war and relative inertia on titanium-specific sanctions, momentum is building in favor of policy reevaluation. The European Commission is preparing its nineteenth sanctions package against Russia, which may include metallurgical restrictions. Coordination between the U.S., UK, and EU appears to be strengthening, though as of April 2024, titanium remains excluded from direct prohibition.
In Europe, firms such as Aubert & Duval have received state support to upgrade titanium forging capacity. Titanium metal producers in Japan, Kazakhstan, and the United States have expanded operations to meet anticipated demand from Western buyers. Analysts expect that these efforts will gradually reduce reliance on Russian sources.
The strategic exemption of titanium from Western sanctions on Russia was born of genuine concern for economic disruption in a critical industrial sector. However, more than two years into the war, that rationale no longer reflects the technological or geopolitical landscape. Western aerospace and defense firms have made substantial progress toward alternate sourcing, and domestic capacity is expanding. The continued presence of Russian titanium in Western markets now represents a growing strategic inconsistency—economically, politically, and ethically.
To maintain sanctions coherence and prevent economic leakage into adversarial defense sectors, formal restrictions on Russian titanium exports should be considered. The long-term security and resilience of aerospace supply chains will ultimately depend not on short-term price optimization, but on a clear redefinition of strategic autonomy.