As the global race for critical minerals intensifies, the United States is poised to take a significant leap forward with plans to launch a $5 billion mining investment fund, its largest government-backed foray into direct resource dealmaking to date. At the heart of this initiative is a proposed joint venture between the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and Orion Resource Partners, a major New York-based private equity firm specializing in mining and natural resources.
The fund, if finalized, would dramatically reshape the U.S. government’s involvement in securing global mineral supplies. It marks a shift from reactive posturing into proactive capital deployment directly targeting key supply chain vulnerabilities in lithium, cobalt, copper, nickel, and rare earth elements that underpin technologies powering electric vehicles, renewable energy, semiconductors, and defense systems.
The Trump administration has made critical minerals a cornerstone of its industrial and national security policy, aiming to reduce dependence on China, which currently controls the bulk of global processing and refining of these raw materials. “This is not about market diversification anymore, it's resource sovereignty,” said one U.S. defense official familiar with the strategy.
Over the past few years, Chinese firms, backed by state policy, have snapped up strategic mining assets across Africa, Latin America, and Asia. Washington is increasingly concerned that its clean energy transition and defense manufacturing base remain vulnerable to geopolitical leverage or, worse, supply disruptions, as seen earlier this year when China curbed rare earth exports during a semiconductor trade dispute.
To offset that leverage, Washington has been forging new bilateral ties focused on minerals, including recent progress on deals with Pakistan, Ukraine, Greenland, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and increasing funding for domestic producers like MP Materials, the only rare earth miner in the U.S. however, the proposed DFC-Orion fund represents something different: the creation of a public-private global investment vehicle capable of engaging in large-scale mining acquisitions, equity deals, offtake arrangements, processing infrastructure, and even refinery construction, all at a speed and scale previously unseen.
According to sources familiar with the matter, both the DFC and Orion would likely commit $2.5 billion each, scaling over time to reach a total of $5 billion. While terms are still under negotiation, the structure is expected to mirror Orion’s recent $1.2 billion minerals fund with Abu Dhabi sovereign wealth fund ADQ. Orion, with $8 billion in assets under management, already spans private equity, credit financing, and commodity trading across the global metals market. It has a reputation for aggressive pursuit of high-potential mining assets, particularly those located in geopolitically complex but resource-rich regions.
According to Bloomberg, Orion is currently in talks to acquire Chemaf Resources, a copper-cobalt miner in the DRC previously targeted by a Chinese arms group. That deal stalled after U.S. officials reportedly intervened to block a transfer to a Chinese buyer, signaling a new phase of minerals diplomacy where Washington is willing to place a geopolitical value on who controls upstream supply. Adding to its firepower, Orion is partnering on that deal with Virtus Minerals, a firm run by former U.S. military and intelligence officials, further blurring lines between strategic statecraft and private investment.
The implication is clear: America is no longer relying solely on free-market tools in the face of an orchestrated Chinese industrial policy. Lewnowski, Orion’s CEO, has openly argued for more state engagement and called for U.S. stockpiles of key metals like the Pentagon’s recent cobalt tender, similar to the Chinese model.
The DFC, created in 2019, has become a pivotal arm of U.S. foreign economic policy. Originally tasked with supporting private sector development in emerging markets, it has evolved rapidly into a tool for strategic competition. Under Trump’s second term, the agency is expected to be reauthorized with expanded investment authority and a more flexible geographic mandate, including in middle-income countries once considered outside its scope.
Already, DFC has financed several early-stage mining deals. That includes a $150 million loan to Syrah Resources for its graphite operations in Mozambique and over $550 million to upgrade the Lobito Corridor, an African railway line that links Congolese copper and cobalt mines to the Angola coast, bypassing Chinese-controlled infrastructure routes. This summer, the DFC took its biggest step yet, supporting the U.S. Department of Defense’s $400 million equity injection into MP Materials. The deal gave Washington a 15% stake and a secure rare earth supply agreement with price floor guarantees, a model that could be extended across the new $5 billion fund’s portfolio.
The MP Materials precedent is also influencing global markets. Canberra and Brussels are now considering price floor guarantees to insulate rare earths companies from boom-bust cycles and incentivize non-China investments. Some G7 countries are even considering taxes on Chinese minerals exports to level the playing field.
Between geopolitical tensions, climate policy goals, and national security strategies, critical minerals have moved from backroom procurement challenges to front-page diplomatic overtures. America’s bold new path through direct investment and minerals diplomacy suggests that 21st-century geopolitics will be as much about lithium and cobalt as it once was about oil and gas. But challenges remain. Experts warn that mining projects typically span 5 to 15 years from discovery to production. Securing environmental, labor, and local community consents, particularly in complex regions like the DRC, Balochistan in Pakistan, or tribal zones in Latin America, will require more than capital. It will demand a new playbook of inclusive development, transparency, and long-term partnership with host countries.
Moreover, any U.S.-backed investments must navigate the delicate task of avoiding being seen as neo-colonial resource grabs, particularly in contexts with existing Chinese involvement. For example, in Pakistan, Washington’s newfound resource partnership follows on the heels of Beijing’s decade-long dominance through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).
The proposed DFC-Orion $5 billion fund, if launched, could mark the beginning of a new paradigm where America uses financial instruments not just to invest in growth, but to shape the strategic landscape. It’s a gesture that says mineral control is no longer just corporate business; it's the business of national resilience, climate action, and power projection. With overlapping crises in energy, manufacturing, climate, and global security, one thing is certain: whoever controls the supply of critical minerals will shape the future. And for the first time in decades, the United States is preparing to compete for that control not in the shadows of procurement contracts but in boardrooms, minefields, and mineral-rich regions across the globe.