Russian President Vladimir Putin has instructed his cabinet to produce a detailed roadmap for the extraction and production of rare and rare earth metals by December 1, accelerating Moscow’s entry into a strategically crucial sector dominated by China. The directive, published among ministerial tasks on the Kremlin’s website and tied to follow-ups from September’s Far Eastern Economic Forum, also orders the development of multimodal transport and logistics hubs on Russia’s borders with China and North Korea, as well as progress on cross-border bridges two existing rail links with China and a new bridge to North Korea slated to be commissioned in 2026.
The push comes amid a global scramble for rare earths, key inputs for smartphones, electric vehicles, wind turbines, and weapon systems, that has intensified as governments seek to de-risk supply chains long dependent on China. Beijing currently accounts for roughly two-thirds of global rare earth mining, processes around 90 percent of the world’s output, and supplies almost half of the EU’s imports. It also tightened export controls this year in response to U.S. tariffs, underscoring the vulnerability of downstream industries. A subsequent understanding between Washington and Beijing reportedly paused some Chinese controls for a year in exchange for U.S. adjustments on fentanyl-related tariffs, but the episode reinforced the urgency of diversifying supply.
Russia holds significant deposits but remains a minor producer. The U.S. Geological Survey estimates Russia’s rare earth reserves at about 3.8 million tonnes, ranking it fifth globally, above the United States but far behind China and Brazil. Moscow disputes that figure, citing domestic estimates of 15 rare earth metals totaling roughly 28.5–28.7 million tonnes as of early 2023. Despite the resource base, Russia produced only about 2,500 metric tons in 2024, or roughly 0.6 percent of global output, reflecting underinvestment and the complexity and cost of building competitive processing and separation capacity.
The roadmap order signals a bid to close that gap. Analysts note that mining is only the first step; the high-barrier value lies in processing, separation, and integration into downstream manufacturing. China’s dominance rests on decades of scale, technical know-how, and comprehensive industrial ecosystems. For Russia, scaling extraction without parallel investments in midstream and downstream capabilities risks relegating it to the role of raw material supplier, likely at a discount.
Geopolitics loom over Russia’s options. The war in Ukraine and Western sanctions complicate potential partnerships with the United States and Europe. Earlier this year, Russia’s sovereign investment envoy said exploratory talks with U.S. partners had begun, but prospects dimmed in the absence of progress toward ending the conflict. Meanwhile, Washington has moved to secure supplies elsewhere. In April, the United States and Ukraine signed a deal granting the U.S. preferential access to new Ukrainian minerals contracts alongside reconstruction funding, part of a broader effort by the current U.S. administration to stitch together critical minerals agreements across allied countries.
That leaves China, already Russia’s most consequential economic partner since 2022, as the most likely near-term customer and collaborator. Beijing has been importing more raw rare earth feedstock from Southeast Asia for processing at home, and Russian material could fit that pattern. But such a path would leave little pricing power for Russian producers. Unless Moscow can build or access competitive processing and separation capacity and secure stable end markets beyond China, it will be difficult to capture higher margins or diversify geopolitical risk.
Quality and transparency are additional unknowns. Independent assessments of Russia’s deposits differ sharply from Moscow’s figures, and analysts say the grade and composition of the most marketable rare earths may be uneven across known sites. Companies typically disclose detailed “ingredients” only when seeking external capital; if Russia relies on state support or domestic financing, commercial data may remain opaque, slowing foreign investment.
Infrastructure is one area where Russia is moving quickly. Putin’s order to establish “multimodal transport and logistics centers” along the borders with China and North Korea, together with the emphasis on rail bridges and a new North Korea crossing by 2026, aims to ease bottlenecks from mine to market. Better rail, port, and customs capacity in the Far East could reduce transport costs and strengthen integration with Asian supply chains, including for bulk commodities like rare earth concentrates.
Europe’s stance underscores the strategic stakes. The EU has sought to diversify away from China but faces permitting, cost, and environmental headwinds in mining and processing. That makes alternative suppliers, whether in allied countries or elsewhere, attractive in principle. Yet in practice, political risk and sanctions compliance will likely limit European offtake from Russia as long as the Ukraine war continues.
The United States, too, is focused on domestic and allied supply. Alongside the Ukraine minerals pact, Washington has pursued deals from Central Asia to the Indo-Pacific and has considered a broader policy toolkit, including potential investment structures to accelerate resilient supply chains. Against that backdrop, any future U.S.-Russia collaboration on rare earths appears improbable in the near term.
Russia is late to the rare earths race, but rising global demand and supply chain fragmentation create an opening. If Moscow can marry its geological potential with credible processing capacity and export logistics while navigating geopolitical constraints, it could evolve from a marginal player into a meaningful supplier. For now, however, China’s entrenched dominance and the West’s political red lines mean Russia’s most practical near-term path runs through the Asian processing hub it is, on paper, trying to depend on less.