As geopolitical tensions escalate and global supply chains come under renewed scrutiny, the Netherlands finds itself increasingly exposed to critical mineral shortages, especially as China tightens export controls on rare earth elements (REEs) and other strategic commodities. In 2024 alone, the Netherlands was dependent on China for eight key critical materials, according to new data from Statistics Netherlands (CBS), underscoring a growing national security and economic challenge.
These materials, including cobalt, rare earth metals, magnesium, tungsten, manganese, strontium, tantalum, and fluorspar, are essential to sectors ranging from defense and electronics to healthcare and renewable energy. With China firmly entrenched as the world’s dominant supplier and processor of these critical inputs, Dutch industry leaders are ringing alarm bells about the risks of this strategic dependency.
The urgency of the situation has intensified since April 2025, when China’s Ministry of Commerce imposed new export restrictions on seven types of rare earth elements, materials vital for green technology, magnet production, and advanced defense systems. These include samarium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, lutetium, scandium, and yttrium. Under the new regulations, companies must obtain export licenses to ship these materials abroad, a process marked by uncertainty and potential delays.
This crackdown is already disrupting supply chains across Europe. In June 2025, Germany’s influential VDMA machinery association warned of dwindling supplies. Chairman Bertram Kawlath confirmed that member firms were no longer receiving rare earth materials from China, a development that risks halting European automotive production lines. The Netherlands is facing similar concerns. As Geoffroy Feij, international business policy advisor at industrial group FME, noted: “Some components that rely on these materials are becoming harder to source, even if Dutch companies are not importing the raw materials directly.”
The Netherlands’ dependency on Chinese critical materials is deep-rooted and multilayered. In 2024, the Netherlands imported €22.3 billion in vital and strategic raw materials, an increasingly large share of which originated in China. Most of these imports arrive not in raw form, but embedded in high-tech consumer goods and industrial components such as smartphones, electric vehicles, computer screens, solar panels, and medical devices.
According to CBS, while the Netherlands ranked rare earth elements only 24th among direct raw material imports, they jumped to third place when considering their presence in finished or manufactured goods. These materials were primarily embedded in products such as computer components, wind turbines, and electric motors, a significant portion of which are shipped from China or pass through its supply chain. Complicating matters further is the structure of Dutch trade. Much of the imported value from China is “quasi-transit”: goods that arrive in the Netherlands but are quickly sent on to other EU countries. However, even when this effect is stripped out, China remains among the top suppliers. In 2023, products containing critical materials worth over €30 billion were imported directly from China, with Germany, the U.S., and Belgium trailing behind.
The rare earths crisis is not theoretical. It’s impacting the Netherlands in real time, especially in sectors like energy storage, wind energy, defense, and high-precision manufacturing. From EV motors to MRI machines, Dutch supply chains increasingly rely on components that are scarce or delayed due to Chinese licensing slowdowns.
The effects are stark. Dutch industry groups are warning of price volatility, production delays, and long-term risks to innovation and manufacturing competitiveness. And while China claims these export regulations are within its sovereign rights and in line with international trade norms, many in Brussels and The Hague view them as politically motivated and economically coercive.
With only two operational rare earth separation facilities in Europe, one in La Rochelle, France, and another in Estonia, the continent is racing to catch up. The European Union’s Critical Raw Materials Act, enforced in 2024, aims to boost local production, processing, and recycling by 2030. But progress is slow.
France is leading investment in expanding Solvay’s La Rochelle plant, which aims to meet 30% of Europe’s rare-earth needs through recycling by the end of the decade. Yet, there are currently no operational rare-earth mines in continental Europe. Projects in Sweden and Norway show promise, but they remain years from producing commercial output. So, in the short term, European supply chains remain vulnerable, and the Netherlands, as one of the EU’s major import hubs, is especially exposed.
China’s dominance in global mineral processing is overwhelming: it accounts for 90% of rare-earth refining and is the top extractor of 11 of the 34 most crucial materials. The Netherlands’ reliance on Beijing for eight key materials is not just a trade imbalance but a strategic liability.
The U.S. has responded with urgency, investing nearly half a billion dollars to build an independent rare-earth-to-magnet supply chain, centered on companies like MP Materials and Lynas USA. Australia, too, is offering allies stakes in its A$1.2 billion Critical Minerals Strategic Reserve, aiming to reduce collective dependence on China.
For the Netherlands, collaboration may be the next step. As the EU negotiates critical mineral trade agreements with countries such as Argentina, Canada, and Australia, Dutch companies and policymakers must push for greater diversification of sourcing strategies and for investment in domestic and regional refining capacity.
While Dutch businesses are rightfully focused on short-term costs and disruptions, the long-term risk is far more pervasive: strategic stagnation. Without secure access to critical materials, whether through new mining partnerships, recycling initiatives, or government-backed stockpiles, the Netherlands risks falling behind in the global race for green, digital, and defense technology leadership. As President Macron’s advisor on strategic materials, Benjamin Gallezot noted: “Dependence on a single source is dangerous.”
The path to resilience will require action on multiple fronts: greater EU cooperation, smarter R&D investment, public-private partnerships, and stronger trade partnerships beyond China’s reach. For the Netherlands, securing its future starts with reducing its reliance on China’s mineral grip before the next crisis deepens the silence on Europe’s assembly lines.