The global supply chain for Rare Earth Elements (REEs) continues to experience significant and enduring strains, with a recent trade truce offering only a reprieve rather than a fundamental resolution. The primary source of this vulnerability stems from China's overwhelming dominance across the entire REE value chain, from raw material extraction to advanced processing and magnet production.
This report highlights the strategic nature of China's export controls, which are leveraged as a geopolitical tool, and the profound implications for critical sectors, including defense, advanced technology, and green energy. Despite increasing global efforts towards diversification, formidable challenges persist, including the immense capital investment required, long development timelines for new facilities, and a significant technological gap outside China.
The environmental and ethical complexities of REE mining further complicate the landscape. To enhance supply chain resilience, strategic recommendations for governments and industries emphasize the need for sustained investment, international collaboration, and a shift towards sustainable and ethical sourcing practices.
Furthermore, the concept of "abundance" about rare earth elements can be misleading, masking a hidden fragility in their supply. While REEs are indeed "relatively abundant in the Earth's crust," the crucial distinction lies in the scarcity of "minable concentrations". This apparent contradiction highlights that geological presence does not automatically translate to accessible supply.
The true bottlenecks in the supply chain are not the absolute scarcity of the raw material itself, but rather the inherent difficulty, high cost, and significant environmental repercussions associated with their extraction and, more critically, their refining. This implies that merely discovering new deposits is insufficient to address supply chain vulnerabilities.
The real challenge lies in developing economically viable, environmentally sustainable, and technologically advanced extraction and processing capabilities outside of China, which represents a much higher barrier to entry than simply identifying geological reserves.
China's overwhelming control of the global rare earth supply chain is not an incidental development but the culmination of decades of strategic investment and policy implementation. This deliberate strategy included substantial state-directed investment in mining technology, generous subsidies for processing facilities, and the adoption of looser environmental regulations that significantly lowered extraction costs.
Beyond domestic development, China also strategically acquired foreign rare earth intellectual property, further solidifying its technological advantage. The long-term strategic foresight behind this accumulation of control is encapsulated by Deng Xiaoping's famous quote from the 1990s: "The Middle East has oil; China has rare earths".
This historical trajectory has resulted in China's formidable current market share and control across the rare earth value chain. China presently accounts for approximately 63% of the world's rare earth mining, an even more dominant 85% of rare earth processing, and an overwhelming 92% of global rare earth magnet production. In 2023,
China commanded over 69% of the estimated 350,000 tonnes of rare earth oxide (REO) equivalent in global rare earth production. This dominance continued into 2024, with China's mine production estimated at 270,000 tonnes out of a world total of 390,000 tonnes. This control extends across the entire supply chain, becoming even more pronounced in the downstream segments. For the specifically restricted medium and heavy rare earths, it is estimated that over 95% of their processing and magnet manufacturing occurs within China.
Overall, China stands as the leading refiner for 19 out of 20 strategic minerals, holding an average market share of approximately 75%.
The following tables illustrate China's significant role in the global rare earth market:
Country |
Mine Production (2023) |
Mine Production (2024) |
Reserves (2024) |
China |
255,000 |
270,000 |
44,000,000 |
United States |
41,600 |
45,000 |
1,900,000 |
Australia |
16,000 |
13,000 |
5,700,000 |
Burma |
43,000 |
31,000 |
NA |
India |
2,900 |
2,900 |
6,900,000 |
Madagascar |
7,200 |
13,000 |
NA |
Russia |
2,500 |
2,500 |
3,800,000 |
Thailand |
3,500 |
3,500,000 |
|
Other |
1,440 |
1,100 |
NA |
World Total |
376,000 |
390,000 |
>90,000,000 |
U.S. Geological Survey, Mineral Commodity Summaries, January 2025
Supply Chain Stage |
China's Global Market Share |
Mining |
~63% , >69% |
Processing |
~85% , ~90% |
Magnet Production |
~92% |
Restricted REE Processing/Magnet Mfg. |
>95% |
The strategic depth of China's dominance extends significantly beyond mere raw material extraction. While China is a major miner, its overwhelming control in processing (85-90%) and magnet production (92%) is particularly notable.
This is further compounded by the fact that China possesses specialized technical expertise and intellectual property in rare earth refinement, which is considered the most valuable aspect of the entire supply chain and takes years to acquire and innovate. This indicates that the real bottleneck for global supply is not just access to raw ore, but the sophisticated, capital-intensive, and intellectual property-protected midstream and downstream capabilities.
Therefore, diversification efforts cannot simply focus on opening new mines; they must address the massive "infrastructure gaps" and the need for "technological development to match Chinese expertise". This requires significant capital investment, estimated at $13-18 billion for new processing facilities, and long development times of 5-7 years. This structural reality makes true supply chain independence a multi-decade endeavor, not a quick solution.
This structural control over downstream processing and magnet production grants China considerable economic and geopolitical leverage. China's ability to influence global markets is far greater than if it only controlled mining operations.
The increasing concentration of control further downstream means that China can effectively "regulate its RE production and trade to remain a leader" and strategically deploy export controls as a "bargaining chip" or "negotiation chip" in broader trade disputes. The power to deny or delay licenses for transactions that could benefit geopolitical rivals or sensitive industries demonstrates this leverage.
This structural control transforms rare earths from a mere commodity into a potent geopolitical tool, enabling China to exert significant pressure on countries reliant on these materials for their advanced industries and defense sectors.
This implies that temporary trade truces, while offering some immediate relief, do not dismantle the underlying power imbalance and the fundamental vulnerability for importing nations.
The recent trade truce between the United States and China, announced in May 2025, included several key provisions aimed at de-escalation. These encompassed a pause or removal of non-tariff countermeasures imposed since April 2, 2025, and a lowering of most bilateral tariffs for a 90-day cooling period. Implicitly, this agreement suggested the scrapping of specific curbs on "medium and heavy" rare earth metals that had been put in place on April 4.
Following the truce, there was an expectation that U.S. customers would find it easier to obtain Chinese rare earth export permits, with China announcing a temporary lifting of curbs for 90 days on 28 American companies.
Despite these measures, the underlying strains in the rare earth supply chain persist, largely because China has retained its export licensing as a strategic lever. China continues to view its control over critical minerals, including rare earths, as crucial for national security and a powerful bargaining chip in ongoing trade negotiations.
The export controls, initially imposed on April 4, specifically require special export licenses for seven medium and heavy rare earths: samarium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, lutetium, scandium, and yttrium, as well as related products, including permanent magnets.
These licenses mandate detailed end-user information and can take up to 45 working days for approval, granting Beijing significant discretion over the flow of these materials.
It is widely anticipated that China will not completely reverse its export licensing requirement, as this forms an integral part of its broader strategy to maintain control over strategic minerals.
Analysts suggest that China is likely to keep rare earths on its controlled goods list, simply approving more licenses for U.S. customers while retaining its leverage. Although these restrictions are global and not exclusively targeted at any single region, the United States remains particularly vulnerable due to its significant reliance on China for rare earth imports, which accounted for 70% of its rare earth compounds and metals imports between 2020 and 2023.
A critical barrier to diversification is China's ban on REE extraction and separation technologies, coupled with its specialized technical expertise in this domain. This "intellectual property" is considered the "rarest thing about the entire supply chain" and requires years to acquire, refine, and innovate.
This technological advantage makes it exceedingly difficult for other countries to rapidly develop comparable capabilities. The underlying structural issues of China's near-monopoly across the entire value chain from mining and refining to the manufacturing of finished products like magnets remain fundamentally unchanged by a temporary truce.
The current situation highlights an illusion of "truce" versus an enduring "control" by China. While certain tariffs may be rolled back, China's core control mechanism – export licensing – remains firmly in place.
The statement that "Beijing has not formally walked back its licensing requirement, which allows it oversight of these rare earths' outflow" indicates that this is not a true de-escalation of control, but rather a tactical adjustment. This signifies that China views rare earths as a permanent geopolitical tool, akin to how the U.S. uses its control over advanced chips.
Consequently, even during periods of apparent calm, the underlying vulnerability for importing nations persists, compelling them to continue aggressive diversification strategies.
Moreover, the situation reveals a deepening intellectual property (IP) and technology gap. China's ban on REE extraction and separation technologies, coupled with its "specialized technical expertise" and "intellectual property," is identified as the "real gap".
This is not merely about lacking physical processing capacity but about the absence of the sophisticated know-how required to efficiently and sustainably build and operate such facilities. This technological advantage represents a far more formidable barrier to overcome than simply securing raw ore.
This implies that even if other countries manage to secure mining rights and capital, they still face a significant hurdle in developing the necessary processing expertise. This perpetuates reliance on China for critical midstream capabilities, making a truly independent "mine-to-magnet" supply chain a long-term, high-investment, and high-risk endeavor for any single nation.
The analysis presented in this report underscores that despite any temporary trade truces, the fundamental vulnerabilities in the global rare earth supply chain persist. This enduring fragility is primarily attributable to China's deeply entrenched dominance in rare earth processing and manufacturing, its strategic deployment of export controls as a geopolitical tool, and the inherent challenges in developing viable alternative sources.
The indispensable role of rare earth elements across defense, advanced technology, and the green energy transition elevates supply chain resilience from a mere economic concern to a critical national and global security imperative.
The outlook for future rare earth supply security indicates a long, capital-intensive, and complex journey, demanding sustained commitment over decades. While significant hurdles remain, global efforts in expanding mining and processing capacities outside China, advancing recycling technologies, fostering innovation in substitution, and strengthening international cooperation offer promising avenues for diversification.
The future of rare earth supply security will be defined by the collective ability of nations to balance geopolitical competition with collaborative solutions, economic efficiency with environmental stewardship, and short-term exigencies with long-term strategic investments.
Ultimately, securing a stable, sustainable, and ethically sourced supply of rare earths is crucial for continued technological advancement, robust economic growth, and the maintenance of global geopolitical stability in an increasingly interconnected world.