Following the dramatic U.S. military intervention in Venezuela earlier this month, which resulted in the capture of President Nicolás Maduro and a political overhaul in Caracas, the Trump administration has pointed to more than just oil as the prize. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick described Venezuela’s mining sector as a “great mining history that’s gone rusty,” affirming that President Trump intends to “fix it.” A senior White House official confirmed that the administration is “closely looking” into Venezuela’s critical mineral assets in collaboration with the private sector.
These statements underscore a broader ambition to secure mineral resources essential for artificial intelligence, electric vehicles, renewable energy systems, and modern defense technologies. Minerals such as nickel, coltan (which yields niobium and tantalum), bauxite (processed to produce aluminum), and even potentially rare earth elements are believed to lie beneath Venezuelan soil. However, experts caution that turning these resources into viable assets for the U.S. is riddled with economic and geopolitical challenges.
Geologists and policy analysts alike acknowledge the magnitude of Venezuela’s mineral potential, particularly in the Guayana Shield region and the resource-laden Orinoco Mining Arc. A 1993 U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) report highlighted this area’s “vast mineral richness,” citing deposits of gold, diamonds, iron ore, bauxite, and possibly rare earth elements. The Venezuelan government itself has previously touted the presence of coltan, gold, and nickel, among others.
Despite this, experts pointed out that virtually all of this wealth is locked within a framework of unstable governance, unproven data, and degraded or nonexistent infrastructure. “Venezuela in theory has a lot of interesting critical minerals,” said Tom Moerenhout of Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy. “In practice, those resources are only relevant if they are economically recoverable reserves. We don’t have that level of detail just yet.”
The Arco Minero del Orinoco, established in 2016 by Maduro, aimed to spur mineral production by allocating 12% of the country’s territory as a strategic mining development zone. However, the region quickly descended into lawlessness, with reports of rampant illegal mining, environmental degradation, and violent conflict among guerrilla groups competing for control.
Gold Reserve Ltd., one of the few U.S. companies with experience in Venezuela’s mining sector, backed Maduro’s arrest but said it remains uncertain about when or whether it can regain its confiscated properties in the country, which are currently being mined illegally. “The lack of legal clarity and enforcement, combined with the presence of armed groups, makes the country uninvestable right now,” warned Alexis Harmon, assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center.
While Venezuela’s oil infrastructure provides a foundation for redevelopment and immediate output, the same cannot be said of its mining sector. Industrial-scale operations for coltan, bauxite, and other key minerals are virtually nonexistent. Power outages and a shortage of imported materials derailed even Maduro’s limited efforts to revive bauxite production in 2019.
According to Gracelin Baskaran, director of the critical minerals security program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), decades of rhetorical celebration of Venezuela’s natural riches have not translated into on-the-ground development. “Without infrastructure, skilled labor, or investment protections, it’s hard to imagine Venezuela becoming a serious player in the short or medium term,” she noted.
Further complicating matters is the role of U.S. sanctions, especially on Venezuelan gold, which have chilled investor enthusiasm. Moreover, Congress has blocked the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation from providing political risk insurance or investment in Venezuela, critical tools for de-risking projects in conflict-affected regions.
Even if the Trump administration succeeds in unlocking Venezuela’s mineral potential, broader global dynamics remain a significant challenge. Rare earth elements and critical metals, even if found in Venezuela, would still require refining, a process largely monopolized by China. As of 2024, China controlled over 90% of global rare earth refining capacity.
“China still holds near-singular capacity to process rare earth metals, and that industrial and geopolitical edge cannot be overcome overnight,” said Joel Dodge of the Vanderbilt Policy Accelerator. Efforts to combat China’s dominance have seen the U.S. invest in domestic mining and refining capabilities and form partnerships with allies, including Canada, Australia, Malaysia, and, most recently, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).
Compared to Venezuela, countries like the DRC already have better-established mining sectors and confirmed reserves of critical raw materials like cobalt and copper, albeit with their own challenges, including severe human rights concerns and ongoing conflict.
The magnitude of the political and economic challenges in Venezuela has led many experts to question whether it will ever become a significant part of the U.S. critical minerals supply chain. “Venezuela is so far from being the path of least resistance,” Harmon said bluntly, echoing a caution shared by multiple policy institutions.
Even U.S.-aligned companies have been reluctant. While President Trump has floated plans to allow American firms access to Venezuelan assets, including up to 50 million barrels of oil now being shipped to the U.S., enthusiasm for mining ventures has been tepid. During a recent meeting, an ExxonMobil executive reportedly told Trump that Venezuela remained “uninvestable,” a comment met with threats to block Exxon from future contracts.
There are signs that Venezuela may not be the only country in the region under scrutiny. Analysts point to growing U.S. interest in resource-rich countries like Colombia, Chile, and even Greenland. James Downes of the Centre for Research and Social Progress suggested that Venezuela could be “just the first domino” in a broader strategic push to secure critical supply chains.
Already, there have been diplomatic tensions over mineral access: the Trump administration has exerted pressure on Colombia, and even flirted with ambitions in Greenland, prompting rebukes from Denmark.
While Venezuela does have critical mineral endowments that could support U.S. economic and national security priorities, mining them will require more than military intervention or corporate interest. Without a stable political framework, modern infrastructure, and significant upfront investment, the dream of transforming Venezuela into a linchpin in America’s critical minerals supply chain remains remote. For now, experts agree, talk of a Venezuelan mining boom may amount to little more than political theater, at least for the next decade.